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1Quality Management by Warranty Contract under
Dual Asymmetric Information
Zhihua Chen, Yanfei Lan, Xiang Li, Changjing Shang, and Qiang Shen
Abstract—Product failure resulting from sourcing supplier’s
defective component has compelled a brand owner to enhance
quality management, especially when the supplier has infor-
mational advantage. We examine a brand owner’s problem of
screening a certain supplier’s inherent quality level with an
attempt to induce supply chain partners’ quality efforts using
the warranty contract based on information acquired from
inspection technology. A supplier’s inherent quality level is herein
determined by the private information held by the supplier
and is typically characterised as an uncertain variable. The
optimal warranty contracts and the expected profits of the brand
owner and the supplier are derived from four different scenarios
under the framework of uncertainty theory and principal-agent
theory. We find that under the condition of pure double moral
hazard or pure adverse selection, the first-best outcomes can
be achieved without incurring agency cost under the designed
contract. However, double moral hazard combined with adverse
selection often leads to under-investment in quality efforts as the
supplier can shirk by misreporting her type. Consequently, we
present the menu of warranty contracts to screen the supplier’s
private information. Finally, we provide empirical managerial
recommendations on mitigating potential adverse impacts caused
by information asymmetry, supported with numerical investiga-
tions.
Index Terms—Quality management, Uncertainty theory, Ad-
verse selection, Double moral hazard, Warranty contract.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quality management has arguably become a more challeng-
ing task for many brand owners because nowadays, product
components are usually outsourced from independent sup-
pliers, rather than from the subdivisions of an integrated
supply chain. In a supply chain involving collaboration, im-
proving end-product quality will normally extend beyond the
boundaries of the firms’ in-house process capabilities. If the
components delivered by a supplier break down or faults occur
within the brand owner’s manufacturing process, there will
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be product defects and the defective product will often result
in a large number of product recalls and a huge profit loss:
the repair/replacement cost and opportunity costs such as lost
sales due to customer dissatisfaction for the brand owner. For
example, in 2017, Boeing suspended 737 MAX flights after
being informed of a potential quality issue about the aircraft’s
LEAP-1B engine provided by an independent supplier CFM
International Company. As a result, aircraft delivery would be
delayed, thereby affecting the Boeing’s customer dissatisfac-
tion and company reputation.1 In the electronics industry, in
April 2016, due to the explosion of the battery outsourced
and bought from the supplier ATL, Samsung announced a
recall of 3.6 million Galaxy Note 7 and suffered a loss of
$5 billion cost.2 There are also many examples to display that
product defects will affect a brand owner’s current and future
profits. This means that any brand owner has to take quality
management seriously, necessitating a deeper understanding
of the quality improvement incentives to ensure better product
performance.
In supply chain quality management, the supplier may have
private information about its inherent quality level causing
adverse selection, whilst the supply chain partners’ quality
efforts are generally not observable and contractible to each
other causing double moral hazard [1]. Even through the brand
owner takes on serious quality check or conducts quality
audits at its potential suppliers’ facilities, only the incoming
average quality may be known which is achieved jointly by
both the inherent quality level and the quality efforts. The
brand owner may not be able to distinguish the supplier’s
accurate inherent quality level and quality effort level, which is
detrimental to the brand owner for enhancing product quality
and revenue. For example, in 2007, since Samsung could not
screen ATL’s quality details (e.g., inherent quality level and
quality effort) while trying to ensure improved performance of
battery quality, Samsung decided to terminate its collaboration
with the supplier ATL.3
As indicated above, dual asymmetric information (e.g., hid-
den information and hidden actions) result in adverse selection
and double moral hazard problems and makes it difficult
to achieve good product quality, which may significantly
compromise the potential profit for the brand owner. Specially,
“double moral hazard” is subordinate to “dual asymmetric
information” and they have different meanings. We mainly
study the contracting relationship between the brand owner and
1http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/2017-05-11/doc-
ifyfekhi7280825.shtml
2http://www.donews.com/net/201609/2938501.shtml
3http://tech.ifeng.com/a/20170821/44666215 0.shtml
2component supplier in the background of “dual asymmetric
information”, which includes adverse selection (i.e., the brand
owner has to screen the supplier’s private information about
the accurate inherent quality level) and double moral hazard
(i.e., neither the brand owner nor the supplier can observe each
other’s quality effort).
Furthermore, because the supplier’s accurate inherent qual-
ity level is his private information, there is usually no observed
historical data about the supplier’s accurate inherent quality
level, especially when the brand owner contracts with a new
supplier [2]. This fact leads to that the probability distribution
cannot be estimated from the frequency due to the lack of
them. Hence, probability theory is no longer applicable to be
used to characterize these incomplete information. Whereas
uncertainty theory founded by [3] has been proved to be
appropriate to model incomplete information without observed
data by inviting some domain experts to evaluate the belief
degree that each event will occur (e.g., [4], [5] and [6]). In this
situation, the novel contribution is that using the uncertainty
theory to characterize the incomplete information in supply
chain quality management.
The revelation principle as per the principal-agent theory
can provide support for the brand owner to screen the asym-
metric information if a certain rational incentive mechanism
can be devised [7]. Furthermore, the approach that combines
warranty contract and inspection over incoming components
has been widely adopt to ensure quality improvement (e.g.
[8], [9] and [10]). Following this approach, the brand owner
inspects an incoming component after receiving it from the
supplier and penalises the supplier with warranty, based on
the number of defective components identified during the
inspection process.
We intend to provide a new perspective on how asymmetric
information about the supplier’s inherent quality level and
unobservable effort may affect the brand owner’s contract
design and also, on supply chain partners’ quality invest-
ment and optimal profits. In particular, the research ques-
tions addressed herein are as follows: How can a brand
owner design the warranty contract under different information
structures and how does information asymmetry influence the
optimal contracting strategies? If exact information regarding
the supplier’s inherent quality level is not available or the
quality efforts are not observable, can the brand owner design
contracts to screen supplier type as well as to induce the
first-best quality improvement efforts? How does information
asymmetry impact upon the brand owner’s and the supplier’s
optimal profits? Under what conditions is knowing the sup-
plier’s initial quality and contracting on supply chain partners’
quality efforts valuable to the brand owner?
To answer these questions, we consider a two-tier supply
chain in which a brand owner manufactures products using
components directly bought from a component supplier. The
supplier is privately informed about its inherent quality level
and may make unobservable quality effort to improve the
components’ quality. When the brand owner receives the com-
ponents delivered by the supplier, she will conduct inspection-
based approach, i.e., the components will be inspected and
the supplier will be penalised for all defective components
identified by the inspection. Afterwards, the brand owner
makes its own quality effort which cannot be observed by
the supplier during the manufacturing process. Eventually, the
brand owner sells to the consumer the final product whose
quality is decided by the component and the manufacturing
process. Thus, adverse selection (i.e., the brand owner has to
screen the supplier’s private information about the accurate
inherent quality level) and double moral hazard (i.e., neither
the brand owner nor the supplier can observe each other’s
quality effort) are presented. Also, this may incur an external
failure cost if the product fails in the market. Supported
with the framework of uncertainty theory and principal-agent
theory, we examine the optimal warranty contract and supply
chain partners’ profits in different information scenarios.
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
• We examine how the supplier’s inherent quality level and
unobservable effort affect the brand owner’s contract design
and also, on supply chain partners’s quality investment and
optimal profits under four information cases: complete in-
formation, pure adverse selection, pure double moral hazard,
and combination of both double moral hazard and adverse
selection.
• We derive the optimal warranty contracts and calculate both
supply chain parties’ profits under four information cases.
Particularly, we demonstrate that in pure adverse selection
case, the brand owner’s first-best outcome can be achieved.
However, the situation of both adverse selection and double
moral hazard may lead to under-investment in quality efforts.
• We investigate the impacts of supplier’s dual asymmetric
information on the brand owner by comparing the brand
owner’s and the supplier’s optimal profit, again with respect to
the four information cases. Counterintuitive it may sound, we
show that the brand owner’s first-best outcome can be attained
and the supplier’s agency cost does not exist in both pure
double moral hazard and pure adverse selection case by using
the designed warranty contract.
• Relative to first-best, however, the combination cases with
both double moral hazard and adverse selection result in a
lower profit and a positive agency cost for the brand owner.
Also, we identify three factors that determine the value of
information for the supply chain partners, in terms of the profit
differences between the case of complete information and that
of combination of double moral hazard and adverse selection.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II
reviews related literature. Section III presents the basic model-
ing framework. Section IV studies the optimal solutions under
symmetric information about inherent quality level. Section V
derives the optimal solutions under asymmetric information
regarding inherent quality level. Section VI provides compar-
ative statics. Section VII concludes the paper. All the proofs
are provided in the “Appendix”.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The work presented here intersects with the following
research areas: the quality management in supply chains and
the principal-agent approaches based on uncertainty theory.
The quality management literature mainly focuses on de-
signing optimal quality improvement approaches in supply
3chains. [1] considered two contractual agreements of cost
sharing based on selective root cause analysis and partial cost
sharing based on complete root cause analysis, and showed
that both contracts can achieve the first best effort levels. [2]
analysed the impact of certification standards on the supplier’s
investment in quality by screening the supplier’s investment
in quality. [8] investigated a deferred payment mechanism, an
inspection mechanism, and a combined mechanism of these for
dealing with product adulteration problems in the single moral-
hazard case and identified the conditions where the deferred
payment mechanism may dominant the inspection mechanism.
[11] modeled manufacturer’s choice of inspection strategy
and characterised the Nash equilibrium between a supplier
and a manufacturer by embedding two compensation schemes
of price rebate and warranty in the cost sharing contracts.
[12] investigated the link between product design, supplier’s
investment and supply-chain efficiency, based on information
from incoming inspection and external failure in the separable
and non-separable product cases under double moral hazard.
[13] examined the optimal warranty/penalty contract in the
single and double moral hazard cases between a buyer and a
supplier, based on incoming inspection and external failures.
[14] studied the buyer’s problem of inducing the supplier’s
quality effort using two arrangements: the appraisal regime
and the certification regime, and gave the trade-off between
these two arrangements. [15] looked into a supply chain
contract problem by combining pricing with warranty when
the supplier’s product quality was unobservable and had a
vagueness boundary to the buyer. [16] addressed the potential
coordinating power of the revenue sharing contract in a supply
chain for improving the design quality of a product in a two-
stage game approach. [17] evaluated the relationship between
hard and soft quality management and organisational context.
[18] experimentally investigated how the monetary and re-
lational incentives may affect the overall quality and supply
chain efficiency in a two-tier supply chain. [19] tested how the
buyer may manage the sourced quality by three instruments:
investment, incentives, and inspection. [20] investigated the
effects of mass customization and product modularity on
supply chain quality integration and the impact of supply
chain quality integration on competitive performance. [21]
estimated the effect of supply chain proximity on product
quality and found that defect rates were higher when upstream
and downstream factories were farther apart. [22] proposed a
new model integrating supply chain and IoT, referred to as
SCoT, to evolve into SSCE and thus enhance supply chain
productivity. Just as [9] stated, under inspection-based ap-
proach which manages quality completely based on inspection
information on both incoming components, all quality-related
activities in the supply chain were managed and contracted
completely based on the outcomes of inspections. [23] studied
the efficiency of inspection-based on out of control detection
in wafer fabrication. [24] examined optimal inspection-based
preventive maintenance policy for three-state mechanical com-
ponents under competing failure modes. [25] developed an
inventory model with lot inspection-based policy and found
that optimal order size and sample size were intrinsically
linked and maximize the total profit.
Different from the aforementioned previous studies, we
contribute to this line of research by modelling the quality
improvement incentives under uncertainty theory rather than
probability theory, as none of supply chain members’ effort
choices is observable while there is information asymmetry
with regards to the supplier’s inherent quality level. That is, we
mainly focus on dealing with the optimal warranty contracts
in inspection-based approach (i.e., the brand owner inspects an
incoming component after receiving it from the supplier and
penalises the supplier with warranty, based on the number of
defective components identified during the inspection process),
by incorporating double moral hazard and adverse selection
under uncertainty theory.
Uncertainty theory as coined in [3] has been widely utilised
in characterizing human uncertainty (e.g., [26], [27], [28]
and [29]). In particular, uncertainty theory has successfully
used to model the principal-agent problems under uncertain
environment. [30] established an uncertain contract model to
cope with the employment relationship problem between an
enterprise and rural migrant workers in the labor market. [31]
discussed an uncertain principal-agent problem by charac-
terising the incomplete information with uncertain variables
and presented the so-called principal’s decision rule based
on confidence levels. [32] presented four uncertain principal
agent models to investigate the impact of risk attitude upon
incentives and performances in new product development.
[33] put forward two classes of bilevel uncertain principal-
agent monitoring models, namely, ideal information-based
monitoring and effort-based monitoring. [34] investigated the
impacts of private risk aversion magnitude and moral hazard
when the risk aversion degree and the project variability
are characterised as uncertain variables. [35] considered the
external demand and the product substitution rate as uncertain
variables and explored how cooperation decisions would affect
preferred pricing timing. [36] analyzed a typical water-rail-
road (WRR) intermodal transportation that was composed of
three serial transportation stages: water, rail and road, and
formulated an uncertain bi-level programming model for the
incentive contract design problem under expectation and en-
tropy decision criteria. [37] investigated a three-echelon supply
chain problem in which quantity of defective components and
demands of customers were all characterized as uncertain
variables and three models under different criteria such as
expected value criterion, chance-constrained one and measure-
chance one were constructed. [38] investigated the impacts
of the existence of cost salience and information asymmetry
on the incentive contract and the project manager’s profit
within the framework of uncertainty theory and principal-agent
theory.
Different from the above outlined previous studies in the
principal-agent literature using uncertainty theory, our study
originally contributes to applying the uncertainty theory to
the area of quality management in supply chains while char-
acterising the supplier’s initial quality level as an uncertain
variable. In so doing, this work helps investigate into the
impact on quality improvement incentives in the scenarios
involving asymmetric information.
4III. MODEL DESCRIPTION
Consider a supply chain comprising a risk neutral brand
owner and a risk neutral component supplier. The brand owner
(e.g., Samsung) manufactures a product (e.g., Galaxy Note
7) using a component directly sourced from the supplier
(e.g., ATL). Without losing generality, suppose that the brand
owner plans to produce m units of the product and each
finished product needs n units of the component. Thus, it
procures a total of mn components from the supplier. For
this investigation, as with the relevant literature [9], we set
m = 1 and n = 1. The brand owner sells the final product to
the final consumer and receives revenue r per unit with good
quality, but incurs a failure cost of l per unit with bad quality,
where l denotes the replacement/refund cost and the customer
dissatisfaction cost.4
The supplier first makes a quality improvement effort for the
component in its production process. The component’s quality
is determined by two factors: the supplier’s inherent quality
level x and its quality improvement effort eS . Suppose that
the component’s quality is given by
q = eS + x,
where q ∈ (0, 1). Also, assume that the quality effort eS is
privately observed by the supplier with corresponding quality
cost S = 12e
2
S .
5 Furthermore, if the brand owner conducts
incoming sampling inspections, the incoming average quality
is then known to it but not the supplier’s accurate inherent
quality level. There is usually no observed historical data for
the brand owner about the supplier’s accurate inherent quality
level, especially when it contracts with a new supplier (e.g.,
[1] and [2]). As a result, the brand owner can only make a
subjective assessment about the supplier’s quality level.
The above situation leads to the conclusion that the prob-
ability distribution cannot be objectively estimated from the
limited information provided. As such, probability theory is
very difficult, if not impossible to be applied to characterise
the present problem. However, uncertainty theory [3] can
help solve this problem, say, by inviting domain experts to
evaluate the belief degree that each event may occur. Thus, we
characterise the supplier’s inherent quality level as an uncertain
variable X with distribution F (x) and density function f(x)
on the interval [x, x], where 0 6 x < x < 1. We also presume
the inverse hazard rate (IHR) H(x) = (1 − F (x))/f(x)
on initial quality level, with H(x) decreasing in x. This
monotonicity condition is commonly imposed in the private
information agency literature (e.g., [30], [39] and [40]). Most
parametric single-peak distributions have a decreasing IHR,
such as linear, zigzag, normal and lognormal uncertain distri-
butions (see [3] for details). Note that the similar assumption
that the supplier’s inherent quality and its quality effort are
4For example, Menu Foods, Ltd. suffered huge losses because of defective
products imported from China. In this case, l includes the tangible losses such
as revenue, stock price, class action lawsuits and intangible losses such as loss
of goodwill and reputation (see http://www.sgma.com/press/).
5The quadratic function for cost has been used by [2] and [12]. In addition,
as stated in [12] the specification allows us to derive near–closed form
solutions for the endogenous variables and enables us to compare them in
meaningful ways.
substitutes to each other is also adopted by other quality
management literature (e.g., [1] and [15]).
Subsequent to the supplier’s investment in the component,
the brand owner may exert costly effort for improving the
quality of the finished product in the manufacturing process.
The brand owner’s quality effort, eB ∈ (0, 1), performed for
the desired functions in the manufacturing process has the
corresponding cost M = 12e
2
B . As with the literature, we
assume that the supplier’s quality in producing the component
and the brand owner’s quality in the manufacturing process
are considered to be independent, that is, only both the
manufacturing process and the component must be in good
quality, can the finished product have a good quality (e.g.,
[9], [41] and [42]). From this, the ratio that a finished product
is in good quality is given by qeB .
A. Incoming inspection-based approach
To ensure the quality of the finished product and to reduce
failure rate, the brand owner can implement a quality man-
agement program to screen the component supplied by the
supplier. We consider the inspection-based approach in quality
management, where the brand owner adopts inspection strat-
egy to test the incoming components in a batch with a fixed
cost of I (e.g., [8], [9] and [11]). The inspection mechanism
is not perfect in detecting quality problems: it does not reject
a good unit, nor does it identify all defective units. Denote the
ratio of the inspection method identifying a defective compo-
nent to be θ. This is equivalent to stating that the component
rejection rate is (1− x− eS)θ, where (x+ eS) 6 1, ensuring
that the component quality level is definite and limited. Thus,
the total amount of defective finished product or the ratio of
external failure g(x, eS , eB , θ) = 1−(eS+x)eB−(1−x−eS)θ.
If a defective product in the batch is found in the test,
it will be returned to the supplier and all quality-related
activities involved in component quality in the supply chain are
managed and contracted, completely based on the outcomes
of such inspections. Note that eB and θ are independent.
This is because as with the literature, since the quality of
the manufacturing process and the quality of the component
are independent, and the brand owner’s quality effort exerting
in the manufacturing process is a decision variable, while
the ratio of the inspection method identifying a defective
component θ is an exogenous variable which is determined
in advance, so we assume these two are independent. We
also show that the brand owner’s optimal quality effort is
decreasing in the ratio of the inspection method identifying
a defective component in Propositions 1–4.
B. Quality incentive by warranty contract
In this work, the supplier’s inherent quality level is deemed
to be its private information and its quality effort is unob-
servable by the brand owner. That is, neither the supplier’s
inherent quality level nor quality effort is contractible to the
brand owner. Therefore, from the brand owner’s viewpoint,
the optimal penalty/incentive mechanism should be designed
in order to induce the supplier to choose the optimum quality
effort and reveal its truthful inherent quality level. Here, we
5assume that the brand owner will contract the supplier with
a two-part warranty contract (P ,W ), where P (P > 0) is the
up-front payment from the brand owner to the supplier and
W (W > 0) is the warranty payment paid by the supplier to
the brand owner, contingent on the inspection information of
the delivered components. Thus, the total payment that the
supplier receives is given by
T = P − (1− x− eS)θW.
Overall, the sequence of events under inspection-based
approach with warranty contract is described as follows:
(1) The brand owner first announces a menu of warranty
contracts to the supplier.
(2) The supplier observes its own inherent quality level and
then either accepts a contract from the menu or rejects the
menu.
(3) If the brand owner and the supplier agree on the compen-
sation (P,W ), the brand owner pays the supplier an up-front
payment P . The supplier then chooses quality enhancement
effort eS and supplies the component of the whole batch to
the brand owner.
(4) The brand owner inspects the incoming component. If the
component is identified as defective, the supplier pays W to
the brand owner and the component is rejected. Otherwise, the
brand owner accepts the component for manufacturing.
(5) The brand owner then makes the quality effort eB in its
manufacturing process. Afterwards, the finished product will
be on sale in the market. If the finished product is sold with
good quality, the brand owner will earn r. Otherwise, it will
suffer from an external failure with a cost of l.
C. The supplier’s and the brand owner’s profit functions
The brand owner’s expected profit is the product’s revenue
net of any external failure loss, any payment to/already made
by the supplier and any inspection cost, which can be written
as
piB = E[r(X+eS)eB−l[1−(eS +X)eB−(1−X − eS)θ]
−[P − (1−X − eS)θW ]− 12e2B − I].
As the brand owner does not know the supplier’s inherent
quality level exactly, a menu of contracts is offered by it for
the supplier to self-select. However, for reducing the warranty
payment to the brand owner while shirking the quality effort,
the supplier may misreport its initial quality level as x˜.
Given that the supplier reports the inherent quality level x˜ by
self-selecting the contract (P (x˜),W (x˜)), whilst the truthful
inherent quality level is actually x, the supplier’s expected
profit becomes
piS(x, x˜) = P (x˜)− (1− x− eS)θW (x˜)− 12e
2
S .
The first term in the supplier’s profit function is the up-front
payment the supplier would receive from the brand owner. The
second term is the warranty the supplier pays the brand owner
based on the component inspection outcome, and the last term
is the cost of quality effort.
Correspondingly, if the supplier reports its inherent quality
level truthfully by self-selecting the contract (P (x),W (x)),
its expected profit is given by
piS(x, x) = E
[
P (x)− (1− x− eS)θW (x)− 12e
2
S
]
.
D. Incentive problem
Since neither the brand owner’s quality effort in the manu-
facturing process nor the supplier’s quality effort in producing
the component is observable and contactable, both the brand
owner and the supplier choose their respective unobservable
quality efforts as self-interest maximisers. In order to incen-
tivise the brand owner’s effort in manufacturing high-quality
product, its incentive compatibility constraint for moral hazard
can be represented as
eˆB = arg max
eB>0
piB .
Similarly, the brand owner should also design an incen-
tive mechanism to make the supplier exert optimal effort in
producing high-quality component. The supplier’s incentive
compatibility constraint for moral hazard can therefore be
expressed as
eˆS = arg max
eS>0
piS(x, x), ∀x ∈ [x, x].
As the supplier’s inherent quality level is its private in-
formation, the incentive compatibility constraint for adverse
selection should be introduced, which is given by
piS(x, x) > piS(x, x˜), ∀x, x˜ ∈ [x, x],
where x and x denote the possible minimum and maximum
value of x, respectively. This is in order to ensure the supplier
to report its inherent quality level x truthfully rather than claim
another level x˜.
In addition, to ensure the supplier’s participation in the war-
ranty contract, its expected component utility should exceed
the reservation utility obtained from any other options. Without
loss of generality, we assume that the supplier’s reservation
utility is zero (which is also generally made in the principal-
agent literature for representational simplicity (e.g., [43] and
[44])). Thus, the supplier’s individual rationality constraint is
given by
piS(x, x) > 0, ∀x ∈ [x, x].
In the following, we will analyse the optimal quality in-
centive contracts under four different information acinarios
so as to determine how the adverse selection and double
moral hazard may affect the optimal warranty contracts, the
brand owner’s profits and the product’s quality. The four
information cases are summarised in Table 1, where the sub-
section numbers in the brackets stand for where each of these
cases is to be addressed.
TABLE I
DIFFERENT INFORMATION CASES FOR INSPECTION-BASED APPROACH
Quality level No moral hazard Double moral hazard
Symmetric information Case SO (§ 4.1) Case SU (§ 4.2)
Asymmetric information Case AO (§ 5.1) Case AU (§ 5.2)
6Throughout this paper, we denote eZS and e
Z
B to be the
supplier’s optimal quality effort and the brand owner’s op-
timal quality effort in case Z, respectively, where Z ∈
{SO,SU,AO,AU}. Also, we denote the supplier’s up-front
payment and the warranty payment and the brand owner’s
optimal expected profit as PZ, WZ and piZB in case Z,
respectively. We now proceed to analyse each case when the
warranty payment is based on information from incoming
inspection.
IV. SYMMETRIC INFORMATION ABOUT INHERENT
QUALITY LEVEL
In this section, we focus on the optimal solutions under
symmetric information regarding inherent quality level. In
particular, we assume that the brand owner is fully informed
about the supplier’s inherent quality level (i.e., x is known
with certainty). This usually occurs when the brand owner and
the supplier have been working together for several years, and
therefore the brand owner has a good idea of the supplier’s
truthful level of inherent quality.
A. Observable quality efforts
As a benchmark, we shall first determine the first-best so-
lution of the model, in which the supplier’s inherent quality is
known and the brand owner and the supplier are fully informed
about each other’s quality improvement efforts. The brand
owner’s first-best profit and both parties’ quality improvement
efforts in this case will help further investigation into how
such issues would be reflected in other cases. It will also aid
in the understanding of whether the brand owner can design
the optimal contract that achieves the first best profit from its
supply chain partners.
Since there is no need for providing effort incentives and
acquiring asymmetric information, the brand owner’s optimi-
sation problem in Case SO is to maximise the expected profit
function piB with respect to P , W , eS and eB , subject to the
supplier’s individual rationality constraint, which is given by
max
{P,W,eS ,eB}
piB (OBJ−SO)
subject to:
piS(x, x) > 0. (IRS)
The first-best solution of the optimal warranty contract and
the optimal quality investment efforts can then be obtained as
follows.
Proposition 1: In Case SO, the optimal warranty contract is
given by P SO = 12
[
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2
]2
and W SO = 0. The quality
efforts of brand owner and the supplier are eSOB =
(x−lθ)(r+l)
1−(r+l)2
and eSOS =
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2 , respectively.
Proposition 1 reveals that under complete information, the
brand owner only gives the supplier a positive up-front pay-
ment (P SO > 0) and does not require any warranty payment
(W SO = 0) from the supplier. Moreover, the up-front payment
is equal to the supplier’s quality effort cost. This is because
the brand owner knows the supplier’s inherent quality level
accurately and can observe the supplier’s quality effort so
that it can command the supplier to invest the optimal effort
in producing component. Thus, it is unnecessary to punish
the supplier for bad component or incentivise the supplier
for higher quality investment. The brand owner just needs to
compensate the supplier for the cost of its effort to ensure
participation.
Interestingly, Proposition 1 also suggests that the first-best
quality efforts of both the brand owner and the supplier are
decreasing in the rate of defect discovery. That is, if the incom-
ing inspection is inaccurate, the brand owner should provide
more efforts to improve the quality of manufacturing so as to
remedy the deficiency in the component. Synergistically, the
brand owner would let the supplier put in more investment in
enhancing the quality in producing the component in order
to lower the accuracy requirement of the inspection. Note
that eSOB is increasing in x; that is, the manufacturer also
needs to make more effort, even though the suppliers inherent
quality level x becomes high. That is because, must both the
component and the manufacturing process be in good quality,
can the finished product be in good quality. Hence, even
though the suppliers inherent quality level x becomes high,
i.e., the supplier can provide high-quality components, the
manufacturer also needs to make effort in the manufacturing
process to enhance the final product quality (x+ eS)eB .
Based on the concrete warranty contract and the exact
efforts specified in Proposition 1, we derive the brand owner’s
and the supplier’s first-best profits in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: In Case SO, the supplier’s optimal expected
profit is given by
piSOS = 0
and the brand owner’s optimal expected profit is given by
piSOB = E
[[
(r + l)2x− lθ]2
2 [1− (r + l)2] +A
]
,
where A = 12 (r + l)
2x2 − l[1− (1− x)θ]− I .
As shown in Corollary 1, the brand owner extracts the
supplier’s all surplus value. Furthermore, the brand owner ben-
efits better with higher level of the supplier’s inherent quality
level and higher ratio of the inspection process identifying a
defective component. The first-best results in this case can also
serve as a reference for the other cases to be addressed below.
B. Unobservable quality efforts
In this case, we examine the situation in which the supplier’s
inherent quality level is in public domain, i.e., it is a piece of
public information. However, neither the brand owner nor the
supplier can observe each other’s quality effort. The brand
owner and the supplier choose their respective qualities as a
self-interest maximiser, that is, the choice of quality effort
maximises their own expected profits after agreeing on the
warranty contract. Such behaviours bring about double moral
hazard problem for the brand owner, which leads to the
7following optimisation model.
max
{P,W}
piB (OBJ−SU)
subject to:
eˆB = argmax
eB
piB , (ICB)
eˆS = argmax
eS
pis(x, x), (ICS1)
piS(x, x)
∣∣
eS=eˆS
> 0. (IRS)
The following proposition presents closed-form solutions
to the optimal warranty contract and the optimal quality
investment that the brand owner and the supplier should follow
in the presence of double moral hazard.
Proposition 2: In Case SU, the optimal warranty contract
is given by P SU = (1 − x)
[
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2
]
− 12
[
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2
]2
and W SU = (r+l)
2x−lθ
[1−(r+l)2]θ . The quality efforts of brand owner
and the supplier are eSUB =
(x−lθ)(r+l)
1−(r+l)2 and e
SU
S =
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2 ,
respectively.
Proposition 2 reveals two important points. First, it is
optimal for the brand owner to put a positive weight on
warranty payment under double moral hazard. Hence, the
supplier gets incentives for providing quality effort. Also, the
warranty based on the information from incoming inspection
increases as the product’s unit revenue r and the inherent qual-
ity level x becomes higher. Specially, the warranty payment
increases as the ratio of the inspection process identifying a
defective component θ decreases. That is because, based on
the definition of component rejection rate (1 − x − eS)θ, a
higher chance that the defective components are identified, the
supplier would have to enhance his quality effort for reducing
the penalty and component rejection rate. Furthermore, based
on the incentive compatibility constraint for moral hazard:
eSUS = θW
SU , the higher the warranty payment is, the higher
the supplier’s quality effort is. The brand owner has no need to
provide higher warranty payment for a higher-effort supplier
Thus, a higher chance that the defective components are
identified, the less warranty payment is charged by the brand
owner. Second, the first-best quality efforts result in under this
optimal warranty contract in Case SU. That is, even though
the brand owner’s and the supplier’s quality efforts are not
observable and contractible to each other, the up-front payment
P SU and the warranty payment W SU help to encourage the
supplier and the brand owner to choose the first-best quality
investment.
Corollary 2: In Case SU, the supplier’s optimal expected
profit is given by
piSUS = 0
and the brand owner’s optimal expected profit is given by
piSUB = E
[[
(r + l)2x− lθ]2
2 [1− (r + l)2] +A
]
.
Corollary 2 indicates that the brand owner can achieve
the first-best profit by designing the optimal contract given
in Proposition 2. Furthermore, unlike the standard positive
agency cost which indicates the supplier’s net profit in the
quality management literature under double moral hazard (e.g.,
[9] and [14]), our analytical result in Corollary 2 implies that
the agency cost is equal to zero (i.e., piSUS = 0).
Note that the above different finding on agency cost not
only complements the result obtained in the traditional quality
improvement study, but also offers potential usefulness in
conducting future empirical research. Further studies on in-
centive mechanism are required to find the root reason causing
the difference of agency cost between this work and certain
existing results reported in the literature (e.g., [9] and [14]),
of course.
V. OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INHERENT
QUALITY LEVEL
In this section, we consider the case where the inherent
quality level is the private information of the supplier. The
main objective of this investigation is to establish the optimal
warranty contract parameters and to obtain the brand owner’s
and the supplier’s optimal profits when there is asymmetric
information regarding the supplier’s inherent quality level.
A. Observable quality efforts
We begin by analysing the pure adverse selection case, that
is, the brand owner can observe the supplier’s quality effort,
but does not truthfully know the supplier’s inherent level.
Thus, the brand owner’s incentive compatibility constraint for
moral hazard ICB and the supplier’s incentive compatibility
constraint for moral hazard ICS1 are no longer needed. The
brand owner inevitably wishes to maximise its expected profit,
which is subject to two constraints on the supplier’s profit: the
incentive compatibility constraint for adverse selection and the
individual rationality constraint. To reflect this observation, the
brand owner’s optimisation problem can be represented by
max
{P,W,eS ,eB}
piB (OBJ−AO)
subject to:
piS(x, x) > piS(x, x˜), (ICS2)
piS(x, x) > 0. (IRS)
This design problem can be resolved according to the
revelation principle by the brand owner [45]. Indeed, the
direct revelation principle restricts the supplier to choosing
the unique contract that can reveal the inherent quality level
truthfully. Therefore, to solve this model, we first present two
lemmas that simplify the brand owner’s problem.
Lemma 1: In Case AO, the optimal warranty contract satis-
fies the supplier’s incentive compatibility for adverse selection
and individual rationality constraints if and only if
1)
dP (x)
dx
− (1− x− eS) θdW (x)dx = 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1];
2)
dW (x)
dx
> 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1];
3) piS (x, x) = 0.
Lemma 1 provides conditions under which the ICS1 and IRS
constraints are satisfied. As such, this lemma simplifies the
expressions for the ICS1 and IRS constraints. Based on it,
we can further simplify the expression of the brand owner’s
expected profit presented in the next lemma.
8Lemma 2: In Case AO, the brand owner’s expected profit
can be written as
piAOB = E [r(x+ eS)eB − lf − S −M − I − θH(x)W (x)] .
This lemma provides a convenient way to express the brand
owner’s expected profit. According to Lemmas 1 and 2, the
brand owner’s optimisation problem can be transformed into
max
{P (x),W (x),eS ,eB}
piAOB
subject to:
dW (x)
dx
> 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
The next proposition characterises the optimal menu of war-
ranty contracts and optimal quality efforts in the presence of
asymmetric information about the supplier’s inherent quality
level without double moral hazard.
Proposition 3: In Case AO, the optimal warranty contract
is given by PAO = 12
[
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2
]2
and WAO = 0. The
quality effort of brand owner and that of the supplier are
eSOB =
(x−lθ)(r+l)
1−(r+l)2 and e
SO
S =
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2 , respectively.
Surprisingly, we find that if the brand owner’s and the
supplier’s efforts are observable and the inherent quality level
is private, from the perspective of brand owner, it can just
offer the supplier the up-front payment but does not let the
supplier undertake the warranty payment. Moreover, the first-
best quality efforts can also be realised. That is, the asym-
metric information regarding the inherent quality level cannot
deter the supplier and the brand owner from optimal quality
investment by agreeing on the optimal warranty contract as
shown in Proposition 3.
In the case of pure adverse selection without double moral
hazard, the brand owner’s optimal payoff and the supplier’s
optimal payoff can be described as follows:
Corollary 3: In Case AO, the supplier’s optimal expected
profit is given by
piAOS = 0
and the brand owner’s optimal expected profit is given by
piAOB = E
[[
(r + l)2x− lθ]2
2 [1− (r + l)2] +A
]
.
Corollary 3 implies an interesting feature of the pure adverse
selection case that in spite of the incomplete information about
the supplier’s inherent quality level, the brand owner can
still reap the first-best profit from supply chain partner. By
designing the optimal contract, it can completely eliminate the
need for the brand owner to conduct screening for the inherent
quality level and also, to avoid the information expenses
required to pay for the supplier in order to gain the private
information truthfully from the supplier.
B. Unobservable quality efforts
In this case, we discuss the situation where the inherent
quality level is supplier’s private information and neither the
supplier’s quality effort nor brand owner’s quality effort is
observable and contractible. Hence, in addition to the adverse
selection problem, the brand owner faces a double moral
hazard problem. We intend to investigate how the brand owner
screen the supplier’s inherent quality level as well as to induce
quality improvement effort by designing the optimal menu
of warranty contracts based on the defective rate through
incoming inspection.
Taking into account both the brand owner’s and the sup-
plier’s incentive compatibility constraint, as well as the sup-
plier’s participation constraint, the brand owner’s optimisation
problem can be modeled by
max
{P,W}
piB (OBJ−AU)
subject to:
eˆB = argmax
eB
piB(eB), (ICB)
eˆS = argmax
eS
piS(eS), (ICS1)
piS(x, x)
∣∣
eS=eˆS
> piS(x, x˜)
∣∣
eS=eˆS
, (ICS2)
piS(x, x)
∣∣
eS=eˆS
> 0. (IRS)
To resolve this sophisticated problem, we first simplify the
expressions ICB, ICS1, ICS2 and IRS and find the equivalence
of the constraints in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: For any given x ∈ [0, 1], the optimal warranty
contract satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints and
individual rationality constraint if and only if
1) (eˆS , eˆB) = (θW (x), (r + l)θW (x));
2)
dP (x)
dx
− (1− x) θdW (x)
dx
+
1
2
θ2W (x)
dW (x)
dx
=
0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1];
3)
dW (x)
dx
> 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1];
4) piS (x, x) = 0.
Based on Lemma 3, we can further simplify the expression of
the brand owner’s expected profit in the next lemma.
Lemma 4: In Case AU, the brand owner’s expected profit
can be written as
piAUB = E[
1
2
[
(r + l)2 − 1] θ2W 2(x)
+[(r + l)2x− lθ −H(x)]θW (x) +A].
Based on Lemmas 3 and 4, the brand owner’s optimisation
problem can be transformed into
max
W (x)
piAUB
subject to:
dW (x)
dx
> 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
This brand owner’s problem can be analytically solved and
the optimal menu of warranty contracts determined as given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 4: In Case AU, the optimal warranty contract
takes the following form: PAU(x) =
(1−x)[(r+l)2x−H(x)−lθ]
1−(r+l)2 −
[(r+l)2x−H(x)−lθ]2
2[1−(r+l)2]2 +
∫ x
x
(r+l)2y−H(y)−lθ
1−(r+l)2 dy and W
AU(x) =
(r+l)2x−H(x)−lθ
[1−(r+l)2]θ . The quality effort of brand owner and that
of the supplier are eAUB =
(r+l)[x−H(x)−lθ]
1−(r+l)2 and e
AU
S =
(r+l)2x−H(x)−lθ
1−(r+l)2 .
Proposition 4 has the following implications. First, if the
brand owner faces both adverse selection and double moral
hazard problems, the supplier should be asked to provide a
9positive warranty payment. In addition, the warranty payment
increases along with the supplier’s inherent quality level. In
other words, the brand owner prefers to upgrade the warranty
for a higher quality level of supplier, which helps decrease
the likelihood that the supplier selects other contracts for
mimicking the lower type. Second, we find that the supplier’s
optimal quality effort in Case AU is smaller than its first-best
effort; the brand owner’s optimal effort has the same property.
This is because given a certain quality of a finished component,
the higher the inherent quality, the less effort the supplier needs
to invest. Thus, the supplier intends to reduce its effort cost
by misreporting the truthful inherent quality level.
Note that by this proposition, we can compute both the
supplier’s and the brand owner’s expected profit, as described
in the following corollary.
Corollary 4: In Case AU, the supplier’s optimal expected
profit is given by
piAUS =
∫ x
x
(r + l)2y −H(y)− lθ
1− (r + l)2 dy
and the brand owner’s optimal expected profit is given by
piAUB = E
[[
(r + l)2x− lθ −H(x)]2
2 [1− (r + l)2] +A
]
.
In the presence of adverse selection followed by double
moral hazard, the supplier has a positive agency cost. The
brand owner cannot fully extract the supplier’s surplus. In
this case, the brand owner has to pay to obtain the supplier
information, by inducing the supplier to report its inherent
quality information truthfully while exerting the optimal effort
to enhance the component quality.
VI. COMPARATIVE STUDIES
So far we have presented analytical results and provided
theoretical insights into the properties of the optimal menu
of contracts and brand owner’s and supplier’s profits under
four information cases. In this section, we compare the results
on the final product’s quality, the optimal warranty contract
and the supply chain partners’ profits that are achievable in
the different information scenarios. This is carried out in
order to investigate the implications of information asymmetry.
We shall perform an extensive experimental investigation
quantitatively, presenting our results graphically to ease the
exposition apart from qualitative analysis. Particularly, we
will address the following questions regarding the value of
information: What is the effect of information asymmetry on
the optimal contracting strategies? How much does knowing
the information about the supplier’s inherent quality level,
or observing both partners’ efforts, help to improve the final
product’s quality? Under what circumstances is the value of
information significant, for the purpose of diminishing the
agency cost and improving the brand owner’s profit?
A. Effects of information asymmetry on contracting strategies
We begin with characterising the variance of the optimal
warranty contract among the four information cases exam-
ined. As the up-front payment is determined by the warranty
payment through the supplier’s participant constraint, the
warranty payment plays the essential role in incentive. Thus,
for tractability and practicality, we mainly focus on studying
the differences of the warranty payment in four information
cases. Based on Propositions 1-4, we can compare and show
their diversification in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: The optimal warranty payments in the four
information cases have the following relationship: W SU(x) >
WAU(x) > WAO(x) =W SO(x) = 0.
In view of this proposition, the optimal warranty payment
under pure adverse selection is the same as that under complete
information. That is, even though the supplier’s inherent
quality level is unknown to the brand owner, the brand owner
can still design the first-best contract for the supplier. This
result holds for the situations with pure hidden information.
However, it will make a difference under hidden actions, i.e.,
the optimal warranty payment will be distorted upwards under
double moral hazard no matter whether the inherent quality
level is public or private. Hence, when the quality efforts
themselves become independent decision variables rather than
those decided by the brand owner, the brand owner should
ensure the supplier to provide a positive warranty aiming at
encouraging it to make appropriate effort for improving its
product quality.
Proposition 5 also implies that the optimal warranty pay-
ment under double moral hazard is higher than that under
combination case with both double moral hazard and adverse
selection. This is because the supplier can have motivations
to conceal true information and mimic other lower levels
of inherent quality under both adverse selection and double
moral hazard. Consequently, the brand owner has to shrink
the warranty payment to avoid such strategic behavior. We
also observed that the optimal warranty payment under com-
bination case has its maximum value, which equals that under
pure double moral hazard as the supplier’s inherent quality
reaches the upper bound (i.e., x = x¯).
B. Effects of information asymmetry on both parties’ profits
In this sub-section, we aim to investigate the impact of the
supplier’s private information regarding the inherent quality
level and double moral hazard upon the brand owner’s profit.
This work may contribute to certain managerial insights of
diminishing the detrimental influences caused by information
asymmetry.
Note that we can intuitively derive that the brand owner can
achieve the first-best profit under pure adverse selection case
and pure double moral hazard case. To investigate the value
of perfect information, we compare the brand owner’s optimal
expected profit in the complete information case with that in
the combination case involving both double moral hazard and
adverse selection through the following measurements:
VIB = piSOB − piAUB ,
VIS = piAUS − piSOS .
In the above, VIB denotes the value of information asymmetry
from the brand owner’s viewpoint, standing for the increase
in the brand owner’s expected profit if it can acquire the
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supplier’s hidden information and hidden action. In contrast,
VIS is the value of information asymmetry for the supplier,
which indicates the profit increase in the supplier’s agency
cost. piSOB and pi
SO
S are the brand owner’s and supplier’s
expected profit under the complete information case given in
Corollary 1, and piAUB and pi
AU
S are those under both double
moral hazard and adverse selection as per Corollary 4.
Proposition 6: The value of information asymmetry for
both the brand owner and the supplier mainly depends on
three key factors: the unit price r, the replacement/refund cost
l, and the defective rate θ detected by incoming inspection.
In particular, VIB and VIS are both decreasing in θ and
increasing in r and l.
Proposition 6 exhibits the differences of the brand owner’s
and the supplier’s profits between the complete information
case and the combination case with both double moral hazard
and adverse selection. We show that the value of information
asymmetry for both the brand owner and the supplier are
decreasing in relation to the accuracy of the inspection process
that identifies a defective component, whilst being increasing
in relation to the unit price and the failure cost. In addition,
the value of information is unaffected by the inspection cost
because the inspection cost is fixed and holds no relationship
with the component defective rate or the accuracy of the
inspection process.
Having already demonstrated the value of the informa-
tion on both parties’ profits analytically, we shall perform
numerical studies in which the values of parameters come
from the real data in a Chinese automotive enterprise to
strengthen the illustration of the results explicitly. In the fol-
lowing numerical analysis, to investigate potential challenging
situations, we obtain that the supplier’s inherent quality level x
is defined on a wide support of [0.5, 0.9] by the estimation of
a relevant manager of a Chinese automotive enterprise, while
obeying linear uncertainty distribution. Meanwhile, the other
parameters’ values, such as θ, r and l are also obtained by
interviewing this manager. We present the result of Proposition
6 in Figure 1, in terms of the three key factors as identified
in the proposition.
As shown in Figure 1, the asymmetric information combin-
ing with hidden actions and hidden quality level information
is particularly valuable to the brand owner when the unit loss
caused by the product failure is higher or the unit product
has a very expensive price. This is because knowing the
supplier’s truthful inherent quality level and contracting on
both supply chain partners’ quality efforts can significantly
reduce the expenses for information retained by the supplier
while improving the product quality. As such, the potential loss
due to bad products decreases and the revenue obtained from
quality products sold in the market increases. Therefore, for a
product with higher replacement/refund cost and higher unit
price, it is critical for the brand owner to acquire information
on supplier’s truthful inherent quality level and to observe its
quality effort.
Figure 1 also illustrates that the more inaccurate the brand
owner’s inspection process is, the less valuable the incomplete
information is to the brand owner. That is to say, it is more
profitable for the brand owner to screen the supplier’s private
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Fig. 1. Effects on value of information asymmetry for brand owner
NB. Parameters used are: r = 0.65 in Fig. 2(a); θ = 0.3 and l = 0.25 in
Fig. 2(b).
information about inherent quality level and to ensure the sup-
plier’s effort to be observable and contractible as the inspection
process cannot effectively identify defective components.
Figure 2 reveals the potential influence of the three key
parameters on the value of asymmetric information for the
supplier. From the plots within this figure, we can also find
that the value of asymmetric information for the supplier is
equal to its own sole agency cost under the combination case
with both double moral hazard and adverse selection. Thus,
the supplier can receive more agency cost when the product’s
price is higher, the replacement/refund cost is larger, or the
inspection process has a lower precision. This is of course
expected, demonstrating the correctness of the proposed work.
By comparing the simulation results in Figure 1 and Figure
2, it is shown that the monotonicity of the value of information
asymmetry with respect to the parameters θ, l and r for the
supplier is the same to that for the brand owner. This is
because the agency cost is also considered as an expense for
gaining information. Consequently, the simulation results in
Figure 1 and Figure 2 can also validate our analytical results
in Proposition 6, such that the value of information for the
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brand owner and that for the supplier are both decreasing in
relation to θ and increasing in response to r and l.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented an approach that is intended to
model the contracting relationship between a brand owner
and a supplier. The brand owner who manufactures a product
imports components from a supplier, and there is incomplete
information regarding the supplier’s inherent quality level
whilst the quality efforts of the brand owner and supplier
are generally and mutually unobservable. Using insights from
uncertainty theory and principal-agent theory, we characterise
the optimal warranty mechanism and the levels of effort
the brand owner and the supplier would exert under four
information scenarios. For each case, the work captures the
brand owner’s and the supplier’s profits. This work has also
investigated the potential impact of information asymmetry
regarding double moral hazard and adverse selection on the
optimal warranty contract, quality investment and the supply
chain partners’ profits.
The paper has shown that the brand owner may only
need to pay the supplier a fixed up-front payment without
any warranty in the complete information or pure adverse
selection case. Warranty payment should be designed to induce
the supplier’s quality improvement effort if the supplier’s
effort is unobservable. Particularly, warranty payment should
increase as the product’s unit price or the inherent quality
level becomes higher, or as the ratio of the inspection process
that identifies a defective component decreases. When the
brand owner encounters both double moral hazard and adverse
selection, the optimal warranty payment should be lower than
that when the brand owner encounters pure double moral
hazard problem, thereby preventing the supplier mimicking
other lower levels of inherent quality. If the brand owner
adopts the optimal warranty contract as proposed, the first-
best quality investment can be achieved if there exists one-
dimensional asymmetric information between the brand owner
and the supplier. However, double moral hazard together with
adverse selection may lead to under-investment in quality
efforts.
Note that the brand owner can achieve the first-best profit
when either the supplier’s inherent quality level becomes
public information or both supply chain partners’ efforts are
contractible. Thus, the existence of pure adverse selection
problem or pure double moral hazard problem does not add
any additional information cost for the brand owner. This
result implies that as the brand owner’s problem generally
involves both adverse selection and double moral hazard it
may suffer from an unnecessary loss. The work has further
demonstrated that such a loss increases in response to the unit
price and the failure cost while decreasing in relation to the
accuracy of the inspection process utilised to identify defective
components. This suggests that from the brand owner’s profit
maximisation perspective, it will be beneficial to have more
inferior inspection and better information about the supplier’s
private information with higher product’s unit price, and hence
less overall failure cost.
Future work will include the examination of the contracting
relationship between the brand owner and the consumers and
its impact upon the warranty contract for the supplier. Our
work can also be extended to investigating the optimal menu
of warranty contract under dual information asymmetry within
alternative quality management mechanisms, e.g., the supplier
certification approach [2] and the failure-based approach [46].
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1. In the framework of principal-agent
theory, the supplier’s individual rationality constraint (IRS)
binds at optimality. Consequently, we can substitute the up-
front payment into the brand owner’s objective function and
obtain:
piB = r(x+ eS)eB − l[1− (x+ eS)eB − (1− x− eS)θ]
− 12e2S − 12e2B − I.
Here, to guarantee that the brand owner’s or the supplier’s
marginal quality effort profit is higher than their respective
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marginal effort cost, we assume that (r + l) < 1. The
first-order conditions with respect to eS and eB are given
by eS = (r + l)eB − lθ and eB = (r + l)(x + eS),
respectively. By using the method of simultaneous solution,
we have eSOB =
(x−lθ)(r+l)
1−(r+l)2 and e
SO
S =
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2 . In the
condition of complete information, the brand owner knows the
supplier’s inherent quality level while the quality efforts are
observable. Thus, the brand owner does not need the warranty
for providing incentive, i.e., W SO = 0. Substituting the opti-
mal quality efforts above into the binding individual rationality
constraint, the corresponding optimal up-front payment can be
derived immediately: P SO = 12
[
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2
]2
. The proof of
the proposition is complete.
Proof of Proposition 2. In Case SU, the brand owner and
the supplier will choose the quality efforts by themselves to
maximise their own utility. By the first-order condition of the
supplier’s profit with respect to eS , the supplier’s optimal effort
level can be derived such that it satisfies the incentive compat-
ibility constraint for moral hazard: eˆS = θW . Substituting the
supplier’s optimal effort into the brand owner’s profit function
and then take the derivative of the brand owner’s profit
function with respect to eB , we obtain eˆB = (r+ l)(x+θW ).
Therefore, the brand owner’s profit becomes
piB = − 12 [1− (r + l)2]θ2W 2 + [(r + l)2xθ − lθ2]W
+ 12 (r + l)
2x2 − I − l[1− (1− x)θ].
By the first-order condition regarding to the warranty payment,
we obtain W SU = (r+l)
2x−lθ
[1−(r+l)2]θ . Since eS = θW and eB =
(r+ l)(x+θW ), the brand owner’s and the supplier’s optimal
quality investment are therefore, given by eSUB =
(x−lθ)(r+l)
1−(r+l)2
and eSUS =
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2 , respectively. Based on the supplier’s
binding individual rationality constraint, the optimal up-front
payment P can be obtained immediately. The proof of the
proposition is complete.
Proof of Lemma 1. Since
piS(x, x) > piS(x, x˜), ∀x, x˜ ∈ [x, x],
if a quality level x supplier reports as another quality level x˜,
its expected payoff should be less than that achievable while
telling the truth. This is governed by the revelation principle
which implies that the supplier can receive its maximal profit
piS(x, x) if and only if x˜ = x. Thus, piS(x, x˜) satisfies
the first-order condition, i.e., the local incentive compatibility
constraint:
∂piS(x, x˜)
∂x˜
∣∣
x˜=x
=
dP (x)
dx
− (1− x− eS)θdW (x)dx = 0 (1)
and also the second-order condition:
∂2piS(x, x˜)
∂x˜2
∣∣
x˜=x
=
d2P (x)
dx2
−(1−x−eS)θd
2W (x)
dx2
6 0. (2)
Differentiating the local incentive compatibility constraint (1)
with respect to x yields
∂2piS(x,x˜)
∂x˜2
∣∣
x˜=x
= d
2P (x)
dx2 − (1− x− eS)θ d
2W (x)
dx2
+θ dW (x)dx = 0.
(3)
On the basis of expressions (2) and (3), we obtain the
monotonicity condition
dW (x)
dx
> 0, ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. (4)
Next, suppose that both the local incentive compatibility con-
dition (1) and the monotonicity condition (4) hold. We want to
prove that the supplier’s incentive compatibility condition for
adverse selection holds. Without loss of generality, suppose
that x > x˜. By integrating the local incentive compatibility
condition (1) and using the monotonicity condition (4), we
can obtain
P (x)− P (x˜) = ∫ x
x˜
(1− y − eS)θ dW (y)dy dy
> (W (x)−W (x˜))(1− x− eS)θ.
Therefore,
piS(x, x) > piS(x, x˜), ∀x, x˜ ∈ [x, x].
On the other hand, if x < x˜, we can also obtain
P (x˜)− P (x) = ∫ x˜
x
(1− y − eS)θ dW (y)dy dy
6 (W (x˜)−W (x))(1− x− eS)θ.
That is to say
piS(x, x) > piS(x, x˜), ∀x, x˜ ∈ [x, x].
Finally, we need to prove the monotonicity condition and the
local incentive compatibility condition. Using the first-order
condition of piS(x, x) with respect to x yields
dpiS(x, x)
dx
= θW (x) > 0.
Hence, the supplier’s individual rationality constraint is equiv-
alent to
piS(x, x) = 0.
The proof of the lemma is complete.
Proof of Lemma 2. According to
piS(x, x) =
∫ x
x
θW (x)dt− piS(x, x),
we derive the definitional equation of the up-front payment
P (x) = (1− x− eS)θW (x)− 12e
2
S +
∫ x
x
θW (y)dy.
Substituting the up-front payment into the brand owner’s
expected profit yields
piAOB = E[r(X + eS)eB − l[1− (X + eS)eB
−(1−X−eS)θ]− 12e2S− 12e2B−I−θH(X)W (X)].
The proof of the lemma is complete.
Proof of Proposition 3. The brand owner’s expected profit
decreases in relation to W (x). Consequently, W (x) = 0.
Furthermore, using the first-order condition ∂piB∂eB = 0 and
∂piB
∂eS
= 0 leads to the optimal effort levels: eAOB =
(x−lθ)(r+l)
1−(r+l)2
and eAOS =
x(r+l)2−lθ
1−(r+l)2 . The corresponding optimal up-front
payment P (x) can be obtained by its definition subsequently.
The proof of the proposition is complete.
Proof of Lemma 3. By using the first-order condition ∂piS∂eS =
13
0, the supplier selects its own optimal effort eˆS = θW . Thus,
when the supplier reports the inherent quality level with x
truthfully, its expected utility
piS(x, x)
∣∣
eS=eˆS
= P (x)− (1− x)θW (x) + 1
2
θ2W 2(x).
However, if the supplier misreports the inherent quality level
with x˜, the expected utility becomes
piS(x, x˜)
∣∣
eS=eˆS
= P (x˜)− (1− x)θW (x˜) + 1
2
θ2W 2(x˜).
The rest of the proof is similar to the Proof of Lemma 1. The
proof of the lemma is complete.
Proof of Lemma 4. Similar to the Proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. By using the similar method as used
in the Proof of Proposition 3 and ignoring the monotonicity
condition on W (x), the brand owner’s maximisation problem
can be rewritten as
maxW (x)E [ 12
[
(r + l)2 − 1] θ2W 2(X)
+[(r + l)2X − lθ −H(X)]θW (X) +A].
The first-order variation of the brand owner’s expected profit
with regard to W (x) is
δpiB =
∫ x
x
[
(r + l)2−1] θ2W (x)+θ[(r+l)2x−lθ−H(x)]
[δW (x)]f(x)dx
and the second-order variation of the brand owner’s expected
profit is
δ2piB =
∫ x
x
θ2
[
(r + l)2 − 1] f(x)[δW (x)]2dx.
By assuming r + l < 1, we can obtain the optimal warranty
payment WAU(x) = (r+l)
2x−H(x)−lθ
[1−(r+l)2]θ . Based on the relation-
ship between W (x) and P (x), and that between eB and eS , we
can obtain the corresponding optimal up-front payment, and
the brand owner’s and the supplier’s optimal quality efforts
immediately. The proof of the proposition is complete.
Proof of Proposition 5. Observing Propositions 1-4, we can
obviously find that W SO(x) = 0, W SU(x) > 0, WAO(x) = 0,
WAU(x) > 0. In addition,
W SU(x)−WAU(x) = H(x)
[1− (r + l)2] θ > 0.
Thus, the optimal warranty payments in the four information
cases have the following relationship: W SU(x) >WAU(x) >
WAO(x) = W SO(x) = 0. The proof of the proposition is
complete.
Proof of Proposition 6. Because
VIB = piSOB − piAUB
= E
[
H(x)[2(r+l)2x−2lθ−H(x)]
2[1−(r+l)2]
]
and
VIS = piAUS − piSOS
=
∫ x
x
(r+l)2y−H(y)−lθ
1−(r+l)2 dy,
both VIB and VIS are combined with r, l, and θ. Thus, the
value of information asymmetry for both the brand owner and
the supplier mainly depends on three key factors: the unit
price r, the replacement/refund cost l, and the defective rate
θ detected by incoming inspection.
Differentiating VIB and VIS with respect to θ yields
dVIB
dθ
= E
[ −2θH(x)
2 [1− (r + l)2]
]
6 0.
and
dVIS
dθ
=
−l(x− x)
1− (r + l)2 6 0,
respectively.
Differentiating VIB with respect to r yields
dVIB
dr
= E
[
H(x)(r + l)[2x− 2lθ −H(x)]
2 [1− (r + l)2]2
]
.
Note that we can intuitively derive that the brand owner can
achieve the first-best profit under Case SO, hence, VIB > 0,
i.e., 2(r+ l)2x−2lθ−H(x) > 0. Moreover, because (r+ l) <
1, 2x− 2lθ −H(x) > 0. Thus,
dVIB
dr
= E
[
H(x)(r + l)[2x− 2lθ −H(x)]
2 [1− (r + l)2]2
]
> 0.
Differentiating VIS with respect to r yields
dVIS
dr
=
∫ x
x
2(r + l)(y −H(y)− lθ)
[1− (r + l)2]2 dy.
Note that VIS =
∫ x
x
(r+l)2y−H(y)−lθ
1−(r+l)2 dy > 0 and (r + l) < 1,
i.e.,
∫ x
x
y−H(y)−lθ
1−(r+l)2 dy > 0. Thus,
dVIS
dr
=
∫ x
x
2(r + l)(y −H(y)− lθ)
[1− (r + l)2]2 dy > 0.
By using the similar method as used in demonstrating
dVIB
dr > 0 and
dVIS
dr > 0,
dVIB
dl > 0 and
dVIS
dl > 0 can
be derived immediately. Therefore, VIB and VIS are both
decreasing in θ and increasing in r and l. The proof of the
proposition is complete.
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